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WILL DESTROY

19 May 1960

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT : Reconnaissance Operations

1. Attached are excerpts from documents pertinent to the need for extraordinary efforts to obtain information vital to the national security and endorsements of the Agency's reconnaissance operations by prominent US officials and associates. They are arranged in chronological order as follows:

Tab A - The Doolittle Report, September 1954

Tab B - Gen. Mark Clark, Chairman, Task Force on  
Intelligence Activities, May 1955

Tab C - Clark Task Force Report to Congress, May 1955 (classified)


Tab D - Clark Task Force Report to Congress,  
June 1955 (unclassified)

Tab E - Recommendations of President's Board, October 1957

Tab F - Scientific Advisory Panel Report, December 1957

Tab G - Hyland Report to DCI, November 1958

Tab H - Hyland Report to DCI, August 1959

  
Acting Inspector General

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Excerpts from Report on the Covert Activities of The Central  
Intelligence Agency (The Doolittle Report, Sept. 1954)

The acquisition and proper evaluation of adequate and reliable intelligence on the capabilities and intentions of Soviet Russia is today's most important military and political requirement. . . . Because the United States is relatively new at the game, and because we are opposed by a police state enemy whose social discipline and whose security measures have been built up and maintained at a high level for many years, the usable information we are obtaining is still far short of our needs.

. . . It is now clear that we are facing an implacable enemy whose avowed objective is world domination by whatever means and at whatever cost. There are no rules in such a game. Hitherto acceptable norms of human conduct do not apply. If the United States is to survive, long-standing American concepts of "fair play" must be reconsidered. We must develop effective espionage and counterespionage services and must learn to subvert, sabotage and destroy our enemies by more clever, more sophisticated and more effective methods than those used against us. It may become necessary that the American people be made acquainted with, understand and support this fundamentally repugnant philosophy.

Because of the tight security controls that have been established by the U.S.S.R. and its satellites, the problem of infiltration by human agents is extremely difficult. . . . The information we have

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obtained by this method of acquisition has been negligible and the cost in effort, dollars and human lives prohibitive.

. . . This leads to the conviction that much more effort should be expended in exploring every possible scientific and technical avenue of approach to the intelligence problem. . . We believe that every known technique should be intensively applied and new ones should be developed to increase our intelligence acquisition by communications and electronic surveillance, high altitude visual, photographic and radar reconnaissance with manned or unmanned vehicles, upper atmosphere and oceanographic studies, physical and chemical research, etc. From such sources may come early warning of impending attack. No price is too high to pay for this knowledge.

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Comment by Gen. Mark Clark, Chairman, Task Force on Intelligence  
Activities in memorandum to Chairman, Commission on Organization  
of the Executive Branch of the Government, May 1955

The most disturbing finding of the task force is that our intelligence community as a whole is not producing enough "raw" intelligence information from behind the Iron Curtain. In plain words, we are not getting the information we need on the plans, actions, and potentialities of Soviet Russia, Communist China, and their neighboring satellites.

Security measures adopted by the Communists have been provokingly conceived and boldly employed. They have been quite effective, in comparison with our security measures, which have permitted the collection of vital secrets in this country with relative ease. The information we need, particularly for our Armed Forces, is potentially available. Through concentration on the prime target, we can and must get it. Success in this field depends on greater boldness at the policy level, a willingness to accept certain calculated political and diplomatic risks, and full use of technological capabilities.

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Excerpts from Task Force Report on Intelligence Activities, May 1955

The task force is deeply concerned over the lack of adequate intelligence data from behind the Iron Curtain. The information we need on the political plans, scientific progress, and military potential of the Communists is there to be had, and we must exert every conceivable and practicable effort to get it. Proper directional emphasis, aggressive leadership, boldness and persistence are essential to achieve the desired results.

The DCI, as currently supported by the IAC and the intelligence agencies which they represent, is not carrying out in a satisfactory manner his statutory intelligence-type functions, in that the DCI and the IAC are not producing an adequate quality of coordinated national intelligence, as evidenced by the post-mortem analysis of national estimates which reveal many gaps in vital intelligence knowledge; and that this failure is due primarily to the lack of raw intelligence information from sources within the Soviet bloc.

The collection of information is inadequate to meet the needs of the nation's security. Gaps exist which are critical to the development of plans, not only in the strictly military field, but also in the political and sociological fields, especially as they affect the assessment of the military stature of the potential enemy.

Collection emphasis must be maintained on the target area of major

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importance -- the Soviet Union. This is not only the primary target, but also the most difficult one facing collectors. Opportunities for collection of information concerning this area must be exploited to the fullest, and capabilities to build up such opportunities should be developed to the maximum.

Since the size of our own military effort, the direction of that effort, and the plans for the employment of the forces involved should be based on knowledge of the military capabilities of the Soviet Union, it is essential that we have adequate intelligence in order to insure our national security and to employ our assets to our maximum advantage.

The most imminent threat to our national security lies in the military capability, the economic potential, and the political intention of the Soviet Union to wage war against us or any other nation with whom we are bound by mutual assistance ties. Our present condition of ignorance regarding these particularly vital items stems from the ineffectiveness of our intelligence effort. If and when the security of the Soviet Union is broken sufficiently to collect accurate information on these subjects, our own courses of defense and political action can be established with firmness and assurance. In the interim, such measures as we do take must include a calculated risk, as they are based on uncertain and limited intelligence.

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President's Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities

Recommendation No. 13 - 24 October 1957

That early review be made of new developments in advanced reconnaissance systems to insure that they are given adequate consideration and receive proper handling in the light of present and future intelligence requirements.

Recommendation No. 14 - 24 October 1957

That, in the light of recent Soviet accomplishments (1) primary intelligence effort be directed towards the acquisition and interpretation of information on the Soviet missile program, particularly in terms of the capabilities of propulsion-delivery systems (land and sea) and of the sizes of nuclear warheads and (2) that our intelligence on the Soviet Strategic Air Arm be re-evaluated and an all-out effort made to supplement our present knowledge with necessary, additional hard facts.

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Excerpts from report of Scientific Advisory Panel, 5 December 1957

TALENT is a breathtaking enterprise which reveals an unprecedented amount of information about the Soviet ballistic missile program.

We state emphatically that the TALENT material reveals part of a Soviet ballistic missile program of such impressive magnitude and sophistication that it poses both an immediate and continuing peril to the security of the United States.

We urge the placing of the highest priority on the gathering of additional data on the Soviet program by TALENT, COMINT, ELINT, and RADINT.

THE SCIENTIFIC ADVISORY PANEL

Dr. Francis H. Clauser  
Dr. Colin M. Hudson  
Dr. William H. Pickering  
Dr. Simon Ramo  
Dr. G. B. Kistiakowsky,  
Chairman

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Excerpt from Hyland Report to DCI, 14 November 1958

This Panel desires to expand its recommendations regarding collection activities which we believe must be taken.

The limited number of test stands at ranges now known to be in existence and the large number of missiles fired implies a different, but efficient, test philosophy not now understood. The risks in utilization of this source appears to be smaller than the risks to the security of the United States in not acquiring the data.

It is believed that the recommended coverage would produce evidence which will permit further differentiation between the Soviet space and ICBM programs. Such a differentiation will more clearly define the status of each program.

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Extract from Hyland Panel Report to DCI, 25 August 1959

. . . This resource represents the only reliable means for locating Soviet missile sites, and should be placed on the highest national priority.

In view of the improving Soviet air defense effort, we believe that the utilization of the aircraft may soon be limited to peripheral operations. Therefore, we recommend that CIA:

- a. Conduct additional high priority overflights as soon and as often as possible.
- b. Make plans now for increased applications of this aircraft to peripheral operations.
- c. Intensify present plans to provide a replacement, including improved vehicles and reconnaissance satellites.

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